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A PROOF OF COMPLETENESS FOR
CONTINUOUS FIRST-ORDER LOGIC
ITAI¨ BEN YAACOV AND ARTHUR PAUL PEDERSEN
Abstract. Continuous first-order logic has found interest among model theorists who
wish to extend the classical analysis of “algebraic” structures (such as fields, group, and
graphs) to various natural classes of complete metric structures (such as probability
algebras, Hilbert spaces, and Banach spaces). With research in continuous first-order
logic preoccupied with studying the model theory of this framework, we find a natural
question calls for attention: Is there an interesting set of axioms yielding a completeness
result?
The primary purpose of this article is to show that a certain, interesting set of axioms
does indeed yield a completeness result for continuous first-order logic. In particular,
we show that in continuous first-order logic a set of formulae is (completely) satisfiable
if (and only if) it is consistent. From this result it follows that continuous first-order
logic also satisfies an approximated form of strong completeness, whereby Σ  ϕ (if and)
only if Σ ⊢ ϕ −. 2−n for all n < ω. This approximated form of strong completeness
asserts that if Σ  ϕ, then proofs from Σ, being finite, can provide arbitrary better
approximations of the truth of ϕ.
Additionally, we consider a different kind of question traditionally arising in model
theory – that of decidability: When is the set of all consequences of a theory (in a
countable, recursive language) recursive? Say that a complete theory T is decidable if
for every sentence ϕ, the value ϕT is a recursive real, and moreover, uniformly com-
putable from ϕ. If T is incomplete, we say it is decidable if for every sentence ϕ the
real number ϕ◦
T
is uniformly recursive from ϕ, where ϕ◦
T
is the maximal value of ϕ
consistent with T . As in classical first-order logic, it follows from the completeness
theorem of continuous first-order logic that if a complete theory admits a recursive (or
even recursively enumerable) axiomatization then it is decidable.
1. Introduction
Roughly speaking, model theory studies ﬁrst-order theories and the corresponding
classes of their models (i.e., elementary classes). Properties of the ﬁrst-order theory of a
structure can then give direct insight into the structure itself. Investigation thereof was
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classically restricted to so-called “algebraic” structures, such as ﬁelds, groups, and graphs.
Additionally, in modern model theory one often studies stable theories — theories whose
models admit a “well-behaved” notion of independence (which, if it exists, is always
unique).
Continuous ﬁrst-order logic was developed in [BU] as an extension of classical ﬁrst-
order logic, permitting one to broaden the aforementioned classical analysis of algebraic
structures to various natural classes of complete metric structures. (It should be pointed
out that classes of complete metric structures cannot be elementary in the classical sense
for several reasons. For example, completeness is an inﬁnitary property and is therefore
not expressible in classical ﬁrst-order logic. See also [BBHU08] for a general survey of
continuous logic and its applications for various kinds of metric structures arising in func-
tional analysis and probability theory.) For example, the class (of unit balls) of Hilbert
spaces and the class of probability algebras are elementary in this sense. (A probability
algebra is the Boolean algebra of events of a probability space modulo the null measure
ideal, with the metric d(A,B) = µ(A∆B).) Furthermore, the classical notion of stability
can easily be extended to continuous ﬁrst-order logic. Indeed, somewhat unsurprisingly,
the classes of Hilbert spaces and probability algebras are stable, independence being
orthogonality and probabilistic independence, respectively.
Historically, two groups of logics precede continuous ﬁrst-order logic. On the one hand,
continuous ﬁrst-order logic has structural precursors. The structural precursors are those
logics which make use of machinery similar to that of continuous ﬁrst-order logic yet were
never developed to study complete metric structures. Such structural precursors include
Chang and Keisler’s continuous logic [CK66],  Lukasiewicz’s many-valued logic [Ha´j98],
and Pavelka’s many-valued logic [Pav79]. Chang and Keisler’s logic is much too general
for the study of complete metric structures, while  Lukasiewicz logic and Pavelka’s logic
were developed for diﬀerent purposes. Nonetheless, continuous ﬁrst-order logic is an
improved variant of Chang and Keisler’s logic. On the other hand, continuous ﬁrst-order
logic has purposive precursors. The purposive precursors are those logics which were
developed to study complete metric structures yet do not make use of machinery similar
to that of continuous ﬁrst-order logic. The purposive precursors of continuous ﬁrst-
order logic include Henson’s logic for Banach structures [Hen76] and compact abstract
theories (“cats”) [Ben03a, Ben03b, Ben05]. Continuous ﬁrst-order logic does not suﬀer
from several shortcomings of these logics. Importantly, continuous ﬁrst-order logic is less
technically involved than the previous logics and in many respects much closer to classical
ﬁrst-order logic. Still, continuous ﬁrst-order logic is expressively equivalent to the logic of
metric open Hausdorﬀ cats. Continuous ﬁrst-order logic also generalizes Henson’s logic
for Banach structures, and as such, is expressively equivalent to a natural variant of
Henson’s logic.
As an extension of classical ﬁrst-order logic, continuous ﬁrst-order logic satisﬁes suit-
ably phrased forms of the compactness theorem, the Lo¨wenheim-Skolem theorems, the
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diagram arguments, Craig’s interpolation theorem, Beth’s deﬁnability theorem, charac-
terizations of quantiﬁer elimination and model completeness, the existence of saturated
and homogeneous models results, the omitting types theorem, fundamental results of
stability theory, and nearly all other results of elementary model theory. Moreover,
continuous ﬁrst-order logic aﬀords a tractable framework for ultraproduct constructions
(and so hull constructions) in applications of model theory in analysis and geometry. In
fact, expressing conditions from analysis and geometry feels quite natural in continuous
ﬁrst-order logic, furnishing model theorists and analysts with a common language.
Thus it is clear that continuous ﬁrst-order logic is of interest to model theorists. Yet
with research focused on the model theory of continuous ﬁrst-order logic and thus se-
mantic features of this framework, a natural question seems to lurk in the background:
Is there an interesting set of axioms yielding a completeness result? The answer depends
on how one formulates the notion of completeness. To be sure, there is an interesting
set of axioms, and, as we will see, a set of formulae is (completely) satisﬁable if (and
only if) it is consistent. However, as for continuous propositional logic, only an approx-
imated form of strong completeness is obtainable. By this we mean that Σ  ϕ only
if Σ ⊢ ϕ −. 2−n for all n < ω, which amounts to the idea if Σ  ϕ, then proofs from
Σ, being ﬁnite, can provide arbitrarily better approximations of the truth of ϕ. (What
this means will become clearer below.) This should hardly be surprising in light of the
fact that continuous ﬁrst-order logic has been developed for complete metric structures
equipped with uniformly continuous functions with respect to which formulae take truth
values anywhere in [0, 1].
Of course, a diﬀerent kind of question traditionally arising in model theory is that of
decidability: When is the set of all consequences of a theory (in a countable, recursive
language) recursive? Again, such questions can be extended to continuous ﬁrst-order
logic. Say that a complete theory T is decidable if for every sentence ϕ, the value ϕT
is a recursive real, and moreover, uniformly computable from ϕ. If T is incomplete, we
say it is decidable if for every sentence ϕ the real number ϕ◦T is uniformly recursive from
ϕ, where ϕ◦T is the maximal value of ϕ consistent with T . (See Deﬁnition 9.7. If T is
complete, then ϕ takes the same value in all models of T , so ϕT coincides with ϕ
◦
T and
therefore ϕ◦T is the unique value of ϕ consistent with T .) As in classical ﬁrst-order logic,
it follows from the completeness theorem that if a complete theory admits a recursive (or
even recursively enumerable) axiomatization then it is decidable, whence the connection
to the present paper.
Following an introduction to  Lukasiewicz propositional logic and continuous proposi-
tional logic, we oﬀer a deﬁnition of the language of continuous ﬁrst-order logic and then
supply a precise formulation of its semantics. Indeed, this paper can also be seen as an
eﬀort to precisely organize and unify the various presentations of continuous ﬁrst-order
logic found in the literature which are often intimated in a rough-and-ready form. Fi-
nally, we state and usually prove various results needed to reach the goal of this paper:
to state and prove the completeness theorem for continuous ﬁrst-order logic.
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To follow our intuitions to this end, the structure of our approach is largely borrowed
from the classical approach employed to prove the completeness theorem. In particular,
we make use of a Henkin-like construction and a weakened version of the deduction
theorem of classical ﬁrst-order logic. Moreover, various deﬁnitions and results found in
the classical approach are translated to play analogous roles in our development, while
from [BU] we take some basic facts and deﬁnitions peculiar to continuous ﬁrst-order
logic. It will become apparent, however, that our approach diﬀers from the classical one
in many respects. Furthermore, the completeness theorem we oﬀer is formulated with
respect to the semantics employed by the model theorist who studies continuous ﬁrst-
order logic. In particular, our work does not exploit an algebraic semantics. Finally,
we should note that results of research on the interplay between logical and deductive
entailment for both continuous propositional logic and  Lukasiewicz propositional logic
play a crucial role in getting our feet oﬀ the ground so that we may follow our intuitions
in the ﬁrst place [Ben]. (This work of the ﬁrst author is partially based on the results of
work done by Chang [Cha58, Cha59] and Rose and Rosser [RR58] on  Lukasiewicz logic.)
With this, we set out to the task at hand.
2.  Lukasiewicz Logic and Continuous Logic
Definition 2.1. Let S0 = {Pi : i ∈ I} be a set of distinct symbols. Let S be freely
generated from S0 by the formal binary operation −
. and the unary operation ¬. We call
S a  Lukasiewicz propositional logic.
Definition 2.2. Let S be a  Lukasiewicz propositional logic.
(i) If v0 : S0 → [0, 1] is a mapping, we can extend v0 to a unique mapping v : S →
[0, 1] by setting
• v(ϕ−. ψ) := max(v(ϕ)− v(ψ), 0).
• v(¬ϕ) := 1− v(ϕ).
We call v the truth assignment deﬁned by v0.
(ii) If Σ ⊆ S, we write v  Σ if v(ϕ) = 0 for all ϕ ∈ Σ, and we call v a model of Σ.
We also write v  ϕ if v  {ϕ}.
(iii) We say that Σ ⊆ S is satisﬁable if it has a model.
(iv) We write Σ  ϕ if every model of Σ is also a model of ϕ.
We may write Σ  L ϕ to indicate that we are dealing with a  Lukasiewicz propositional
logic.
Remark 2.3. Observe that 0 corresponds to truth and any r ∈ (0, 1] corresponds to a
degree of truth or falsity, where 1 may be construed as absolute falsity. Also observe that
‘−. ’ plays a role analogous to that of ‘→’ in classical logic: We may interpret ‘ψ −. ϕ’ as
‘ψ is implied by ϕ,’ ‘ϕ is at least as false as ψ’, ‘ψ is at most as true as ϕ,’ or simply, ‘ψ
is less than or equal to ϕ.’ We prefer the last interpretation.
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Definition 2.4. Let S0 = {Pi : i ∈ I} be a set of distinct symbols. Let S be freely
generated from S0 by the formal binary operation −
. and the unary operations ¬ and 1
2
.
We call S a continuous propositional logic.
A truth assignment v is deﬁned as in (i) of Deﬁnition 2.2 with the extra condition that
v(1
2
ϕ) := 1
2
v(ϕ). Models, satisﬁability, and logical entailment are deﬁned as in Deﬁnition
2.2. We may write Σ C Lϕ to indicate that we are dealing with a continuous propositional
logic.
3. Axioms: Group 1
We now present six of our fourteen axiom schemata. The ﬁrst four form an axiomati-
zation for  Lukasiewicz propositional logic [Cha58, RR58].
(A1) (ϕ−. ψ)−. ϕ
(A2) ((χ−. ϕ)−. (χ−. ψ))−. (ψ −. ϕ)
(A3) (ϕ−. (ϕ−. ψ))−. (ψ −. (ψ −. ϕ))
(A4) (ϕ−. ψ)−. (¬ψ −. ¬ϕ)
When the next two axiom schemata are added to the ﬁrst four (in the appropriate
language), we obtain an axiomatization for continuous propositional logic [Ben].
(A5) 1
2
ϕ−. (ϕ−. 1
2
ϕ)
(A6) (ϕ−. 1
2
ϕ)−. 1
2
ϕ
Note that (A5) and (A6) say that 1
2
behaves as it ought to. Informally, under the
intended interpretation, (A5) and (A6) taken together imply that 1
2
ϕ∔ 1
2
ϕ = ϕ. (‘∔’ may
be deﬁned by setting ϕ∔ψ := ¬(¬ϕ−. ψ); thus, according to the intended interpretation
of ‘−. ’, the interpretation of ‘∔’ is given by x∔ y = min(x+ y, 1).)
Formal deductions and the relation ⊢ for both logics are deﬁned in the natural way,
the only rule of inference being modus ponens :
ϕ, ψ −. ϕ
ψ
We can make this more precise as follows: a formal deduction from Σ is a ﬁnite sequence
of formulae (ϕi : i < n) such that for each i < n, either (i) ϕi is an instance of an axiom
schema, (ii) ϕi ∈ Σ, or (iii) there are j, k < i such that ϕk = ϕi −
. ϕj. We accordingly
say that ϕ is provable from (or deducible from, or a consequence of ) Σ and write Σ ⊢ ϕ
if there is a formal deduction from Σ ending in ϕ. Observe that a formula ϕ is provable
from Σ just in case it is provable from a ﬁnite subset of Σ. To avoid confusion, we may
write Σ ⊢ Lϕ to indicate that ϕ is provable from Σ in  Lukasiewicz propositional logic, and
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we may write Σ ⊢C Lϕ to indicate that ϕ is provable from Σ in continuous propositional
logic.
It should be fairly clear to the reader how the proof systems of continuous propositional
logic and  Lukasiewicz propositional logic are related. Both proof systems are of course
sound, by which we mean that if Σ ⊢ Lϕ (respectively, Σ ⊢C Lϕ), then Σ |= Lϕ (respectively,
Σ |=C Lϕ). We leave this section with a deﬁnition, a few notational conventions, and a
remark, each of which addresses some aspects of our presentation of continuous logic in
this paper.
Definition 3.1. We say that a set of formulae Σ is inconsistent if Σ ⊢ ϕ for every formula
ϕ and consistent otherwise.
Notation 3.2. Deﬁne ψ −. nϕ by recursion on n < ω:
(i) ψ −. 0ϕ := ψ.
(ii) ψ −. (n + 1)ϕ := (ψ −. nϕ)−. ϕ.
Notation 3.3. Let 1 be shorthand for ¬(ϕ−. ϕ), where ϕ is any formula, and let 2−n be
shorthand for
1
2
· · ·
1
2︸ ︷︷ ︸
n−times
1. Also, let 0 be shorthand for ¬1.
Remark 3.4. Observe that on any truth assignment v the set D generated from 1 by
applying the operations ¬, −. , and 1
2
is such that {v(d) : d ∈ D} = D, the set of dyadic
numbers, i.e., numbers of the form k
2n
, where k, n < ω and k ≤ 2n. For simplicity of
notation, we do not distinguish between the syntactic set D thus generated and D.
4. Black Box Theorems
We now record several results which will be used in this paper.
Fact 4.1 (Weak Completeness for  Lukasiewicz Logic [Cha59, RR58]). Let S be a  Lukasiewicz
propositional logic and ϕ ∈ S. Then  ϕ if and only if ⊢ ϕ.
Fact 4.2. Let S be a  Lukasiewicz propositional logic, and Σ ⊆ S. Then Σ is consistent
if and only if it is satisﬁable.
Fact 4.3. Let S be a continuous propositional logic and Σ ⊆ S. Then Σ is consistent if
and only if it is satisﬁable.
An immediate corollary of the previous fact is the following approximated form of
strong completeness.
Fact 4.4 (Approximated Strong Completeness for Continuous Logic). Let S be a con-
tinuous propositional logic, Σ ⊆ S, and ϕ ∈ S. Then Σ  ϕ if and only if Σ ⊢ ϕ −. 2−n
for all n < ω.
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In fact, this is the best we can hope for. To see why, consider Σ := {P −. 2−n : n < ω}.
Then Σ  P , yet for no ﬁnite Σ0 ⊆ Σ do we have Σ0  P . However, we do have the
following weaker result.
Fact 4.5 (Finite Strong Completeness for Continuous Logic). Let S be a continuous
propositional logic, Σ ⊆ S be ﬁnite, and ϕ ∈ S. Then Σ  ϕ if and only if Σ ⊢ ϕ.
In view of the above facts, observe that if S is a  Lukasiewicz or continuous propositional
logic and Σ ⊆ S,
• Σ is inconsistent if and only if Σ ⊢ L 1.
• Σ is inconsistent if and only if Σ ⊢C L d for some d ∈ D\{0}.
Fact 4.2 – Fact 4.5 have been established independently by the ﬁrst author in [Ben].
Nonetheless, Fact 4.2 has been proved in [BC63] (indeed, for  Lukasiewicz ﬁrst-order logic;
see also [Ha´j98]) and Fact 4.4 has a counterpart in [Hay63] (again, see also [Ha´j98]),
while Fact 4.5 has been proved for rational Pavelka propositional logic [Ha´j98] and for
 Lukasiewicz propositional logic [CDM00, Ha´j98].
5. The Language and Semantics of Continuous First-Order Logic
Definition 5.1. The logical symbols of continuous ﬁrst-order logic are
• Parentheses: ( , )
• Connectives: −. , ¬ , 1
2
• Quantiﬁers: sup (or inf)
• Variables: v0, v1, . . .
• An optional binary metric: d
The sup-quantiﬁer plays the role of the ∀-quantiﬁer from classical ﬁrst-order logic,
whereas the inf-quantiﬁer plays the role of the ∃-quantiﬁer from classical ﬁrst-order logic.
In fact, the sup-quantiﬁer can be deﬁned in terms of the inf-quantiﬁer. Furthermore,
instead of an optional binary congruence relation symbol ≈ as in classical ﬁrst-order
logic, continuous ﬁrst-order logic has an optional binary metric symbol d.
We should now say something about the choice of connectives. In classical ﬁrst-order
logic, a set of connectives is complete if every mapping from {0, 1}n → {0, 1} can be
written using the set of connectives. The set of connectives {¬,→} is complete in this
sense. Similarly, in continuous ﬁrst-order logic, a set of connectives is complete if every
continuous mapping from [0, 1]n → [0, 1] can be written using the set of connectives. But
this notion is much too demanding. Indeed, a complete set of connectives would require
continuum many connectives. A more reasonable demand of a set of connectives is that
every continuous function from [0, 1]n → [0, 1] can be written using the set of connectives
up to arbitrarily better approximations. A set of connectives satisfying this requirement
is said to be full (see [BU]; see also [CDM00]). The set of connectives {−. ,¬, 1
2
} is full
in this sense, and {−. , 1
2
, 0, 1} is full as well — so is any set of connectives which includes
−. , 1, and some dense set C ⊆ [0, 1], such as D or Q ∩ [0, 1]. Here we choose to canonize
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{−. ,¬, 1
2
} as the set connectives. As it is ﬁnite, this set of connectives is an economical
choice, and it is the analogue of the popular choice of connectives {¬,→} of classical
ﬁrst-order logic.
Definition 5.2. A continuous signature is a quadruple L = (R,F ,G, n) such that
(i) R 6= ∅.
(ii) R∩ F = ∅.
(iii) G has the form {δs,i : (0, 1]→ (0, 1] : s ∈ R ∪ F and i < ns}.
(iv) n : R∪F → ω.
Members ofR are called relation symbols, while members of F are called function symbols.
For each s ∈ R∪F , we write ns for the value of s under n and call ns the arity of s. We
call a member of G a modulus of uniform continuity.
Remark 5.3. Observe that members of G are not syntactic objects. Rather, each member
of G is a genuine operation on (0, 1]. The role of the moduli of uniform continuity will
be clariﬁed below.
Definition 5.4. A continuous signature with a metric is a continuous signature with a
distinguished binary relation symbol d.
Terms, formulae, and notions of free and bound substitution are deﬁned in the usual
way (see §6 concerning these notions). We denote the set of variables by V and the
set of formulae by For(L). In classical ﬁrst-order logic, a metric symbol d would most
naturally be thought of as a function symbol. In continuous ﬁrst-order logic, however, d
is a relation symbol, and as such, dt0t1 is a formula rather than a term.
We write ‘supx’ (and ‘infx’) instead of ‘sup x’ (and ‘inf x’). We deﬁne ‘inf,’ ‘∧,’ ‘∨,’
and ‘| |’ by setting
infx ϕ := ¬ supx ¬ϕ.
ϕ ∧ ψ := ϕ−. (ϕ−. ψ).
ϕ ∨ ψ := ¬(¬ϕ ∧ ¬ψ).
|ϕ− ψ| := (ϕ−. ψ) ∨ (ψ −. ϕ).
The reader should verify that the deﬁnition of ‘inf’ accords with the obvious intended
interpretation when the semantics are given below. Observe that (A2) becomes ‘(ϕ ∧
ψ) −. (ψ ∧ ϕ).’ Also, according to the intended interpretation of ‘−. ,’ the interpretation
of ‘∧’ is given by x ∧ y = min(x, y). Thus, according to the interpretation of ‘∧,’ the
interpretation of ‘∨’ is given by x ∨ y = max(x, y), whereby the interpretation of ‘| |’
is one-dimensional Euclidean distance. As 0 corresponds to truth, it should be clear
that the interpretation of ‘∧’ is the continuous analogue of the classical ‘or,’ whereas the
interpretation of ‘∨’ is the continuous analogue of the classical ‘and.’
Definition 5.5.
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(i) Let (M, d) and (M ′, d′) be metric spaces and f : M →M ′ be a function. We say
that δ : (0, 1]→ (0, 1] is a modulus of uniform continuity for f if for each ǫ ∈ (0, 1]
and all a, b ∈M , d(a, b) < δ(ǫ) =⇒ d′(f(a), f(b)) ≤ ǫ.
(ii) We say that f is uniformly continuous if there is a modulus of uniform continuity
for f .
Definition 5.6. Let L be a continuous signature. A continuous L-pre-structure is an
ordered pair M = (M, ρ), where M is a non-empty set and ρ is a function whose domain
is R∪F , such that:
(i) To each f ∈ F , ρ assigns a mapping fM : Mnf →M .
(ii) To each P ∈ R, ρ assigns a mapping PM : MnP → [0, 1].
If L is also a continuous signature with a metric, then M is such that:
(iii) ρ assigns to d a pseudo-metric dM : M ×M → [0, 1].
(iv) For each f ∈ F , i < nf , and ǫ ∈ (0, 1], δf,i satisﬁes the following condition:
∀a¯, b¯, c, e [dM(c, e) < δf,i(ǫ) =⇒ d
M(fM(a¯, c, b¯), fM(a¯, e, b¯)) ≤ ǫ],
where |a¯| = i and |a¯| + |b¯| + 1 = nf ; we thereby call δf,i the uniform continuity
modulus of f with respect to the ith argument.
(v) For each P ∈ R, i < nP , and ǫ ∈ (0, 1], δP,i satisﬁes the following condition:
∀a¯, b¯, c, e [dM(c, e) < δP,i(ǫ) =⇒max(P
M(a¯, c, b¯)− PM(a¯, e, b¯), 0) ≤ ǫ],
where |a¯| = i and |a¯| + |b¯| + 1 = nP ; we thereby call δP,i the uniform continuity
modulus of P with respect to the ith argument.
Here, as well as in the remainder of this paper, a tuple a0, . . . , an−1 may be for conve-
nience denoted by a¯, whereby |a¯| will denote the length of a¯.
Convention 5.7. In this paper we make the convention that for an n-ary function f ,
the ith argument of the expression f(x0, . . . , xn−1) is xi. In particular, the 0 th argument
of f is x0.
Remark 5.8. Conditions (iv) and (v) correspond to the congruence axioms of classical
ﬁrst-order logic. In classical ﬁrst-order logic it is required that a distinguished binary
relation symbol ≈ be such that for each classical structure A, the relation ≈A is an
equivalence relation satisfying the following congruence axioms:
• For each function symbol f and i < nf ,
∀a¯, b¯, c, e (c ≈A e =⇒ fA(a¯, c, b¯) ≈A fA(a¯, e, b¯)),
where |a¯| = i and |a¯|+ |b¯|+ 1 = nf .
• For each relation symbol P and i < nP ,
∀a¯, b¯, c, e (c ≈A e =⇒ (PA(a¯, c, b¯)⇒ PA(a¯, e, b¯))),
where |a¯| = i and |a¯|+ |b¯|+ 1 = nP .
In classical ﬁrst-order logic, one can thereby show that for each classical structure A, the
relation ≈A satisﬁes the following properties:
10 ITAI¨ BEN YAACOV AND ARTHUR PAUL PEDERSEN
• For each function symbol f ,
∀a¯, b¯ ((
∧
i<nf
ai ≈
A bi) =⇒ f
A(a¯) ≈A fA(b¯)),
where |a¯| = |b¯| = nf .
• For each relation symbol P ,
∀a¯, b¯ ((
∧
i<nP
ai ≈
A bi) =⇒ (P
A(a¯)⇒ PA(b¯))),
where |a¯| = |b¯| = nP .
Along a similar vein, in continuous ﬁrst-order logic one can show that for each function
symbol f and predicate symbol P , there are moduli of uniform continuity ∆f and ∆P
which depend on their uniform continuity moduli (δf,i : i < nf ) and (δP,i : i < nP ),
respectively. For example, ∆f : (0, 1] → (0, 1] may be deﬁned by setting ∆f(ǫ) :=
min{δf,0(ǫ/nf ), . . . , δf,nf−1(ǫ/nf )}. Accordingly, in each continuous L-pre-structure M,
the mapping ∆f is a modulus of uniform continuity for f
M with respect to the maximum
metric DMnf deﬁned by D
M
nf
(a¯, b¯) := maxi<nf (d
M(ai, bi)) =
∨
i<nf
dM(ai, bi). This may be
expressed formally as follows:
• For each f ∈ F and ǫ ∈ (0, 1], ∆f satisﬁes the following condition:
∀a¯, b¯ [(
∨
i<nf
dM(ai, bi)) < ∆f(ǫ) =⇒ d
M(fM(a¯), fM(b¯)) ≤ ǫ],
where |a¯| = |b¯| = nf .
In light of the foregoing discussion, observe that for every continuous L-pre-structure M
and s ∈ R ∪ F , sM is a uniformly continuous function.
Definition 5.9. A continuous L-structure is a continuous L-pre-structure M = (M, ρ)
such that ρ assigns to d a complete metric:
(i) ∀a, b (dM(a, b) = 0 =⇒ a = b).
(ii) Every Cauchy sequence converges.
Definition 5.10.
(i) If M is a continuous L-pre-structure, then an M-assignment is a mapping σ :
V →M .
(ii) If σ is an M-assignment, x ∈ V , and a ∈ M , we deﬁne an M-assignment σax by
setting for all y ∈ V ,
σax(y) :=
{
a if x = y
σ(y) otherwise.
The interpretation of a term t in a continuous L-pre-structure M is deﬁned as in
classical ﬁrst-order logic. We denote its interpretation by tM,σ.
Definition 5.11. Let M be a continuous L-pre-structure. For a formula ϕ and an
M-assignment σ, we deﬁne the value of ϕ in M under σ, M(ϕ, σ), by induction:
(i) M(Pt0 · · · tnP−1, σ) := P
M(tM,σ0 , . . . , t
M,σ
nP−1
).
(ii) M(α−. β, σ) := max(M(α, σ)−M(β, σ), 0).
(iii) M(¬α, σ) := 1−M(α, σ).
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(iv) M(1
2
α, σ) := 1
2
M(α, σ).
(v) M(supx α, σ) := sup{M(α, σ
a
x) : a ∈M}.
If one chooses to use ‘inf’ instead of ‘sup,’ one may replace (v) with M(infx α, σ) :=
inf{M(α, σax) : a ∈M}.
Definition 5.12. Let M be a continuous L-pre-structure, let σ be an M-assignment,
and let Γ ⊆ For(L).
(i) We say that (M, σ)models (or satisﬁes) Γ and that (M, σ) is a model of Γ, written
(M, σ) Q Γ, if M(ϕ, σ) = 0 for all ϕ ∈ Γ. We of course say that (M, σ) is a
model of ϕ and write (M, σ) Q ϕ if (M, σ) Q {ϕ}.
(ii) We say that Γ is satisﬁable if it has a model.
Definition 5.13. Let Γ be a set of formulae and ϕ be a formula. We write Γ Q ϕ if
every model of Γ is a model of ϕ. If ∅ Q ϕ, we say that ϕ is valid.
Definition 5.14. We write ϕ ≡ ψ if M(ϕ, σ) = M(ψ, σ) for every continuous L-pre-
structure and M-assignment σ.
With these deﬁnitions, many properties analogous to those of classical ﬁrst-order logic
can be derived (see [EFT94]).
6. Substitution and Metric Completions
Substitution. As in classical ﬁst-order logic, free and bound substitution play an impor-
tant role in connecting the syntax with the semantics. This brief subsection is intended
to remind the reader of these two notions of substitution and to indicate to the reader
what features of these notions are crucial for our purposes.
Definition 6.1. Let t be a term, and let x be a variable. We deﬁne the free substitution
of t for x inside a formula ϕ, ϕ[t/x], as the result of replacing x by t in ϕ if x occurs free
in ϕ. We say that ϕ[t/x] is correct if no variable y in t is captured by a supy (or infy)
quantiﬁer in ϕ[t/x].
The next lemma is the continuous analogue of the substitution lemma of classical
ﬁrst-order logic.
Lemma 6.2 (Substitution Lemma). Let M be a continuous L-pre-structure, and let σ
be an M-assignment. Let t be a term, x be a variable, and ϕ be a formula. Put a := tM,σ.
Suppose ϕ[t/x] is correct. Then
M(ϕ[t/x], σ) = M(ϕ, σax).
Definition 6.3. Let ϕ be a formula, and let x, y be variables. We deﬁne the bound
substitution of y for x inside ϕ, ϕ{y/x}, as the result of replacing each subformula supx α
(or infx α) of ϕ by supy α[y/x] (or infy α). We say that ϕ{y/x} is correct if y is not free
in α and α[y/x] is correct in each such subformula supx α (or infx α).
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The following lemma is an immediate result. The reader interested may consult
[EFT94] for a classical ﬁrst-order proof to see how a proof for continuous ﬁrst-order
logic may be constructed.
Lemma 6.4 (Bound Substitution Lemma). Let ϕ be a formula, and let x0, . . . , xn−1 be a
ﬁnite sequence of variables. Then by a sequence of bound substitutions there is a formula
ϕ′ in which x0, . . . , xn−1 are not bound and ϕ ≡ ϕ
′.
Metric Completions. We will presently see that each continuous L-pre-structure (for
a continuous signature with a metric) is virtually indistinguishable from its metric com-
pletion (Theorem 6.9). To this end, we ﬁrst oﬀer a deﬁnition.
Definition 6.5. Let M and N be continuous L-pre-structures, and let h : M → N . We
call h an L-morphism of M into N if h satisﬁes the following two conditions:
(i) For each f ∈ F and all a0, . . . , anf−1 ∈ M ,
h(fM(a0, . . . , anf−1)) = f
N(h(a0), . . . , h(anf−1)).
(ii) For each P ∈ R and all a0, . . . , anP−1 ∈M ,
PM(a0, . . . , anP−1) = P
N(h(a0), . . . , h(anP−1)).
We call h an elementary L-morphism if h is an L-morphism and for every M-assignment
σ and formula ϕ, M(ϕ, σ) = N(ϕ, h ◦ σ).
Observe that if L is a continuous signature with a metric d and h is an L-morphism
of M into N, then for all a0, a1 ∈M ,
dM(a0, a1) = d
N(h(a0), h(a1)).
In other words, h is an isometry.
An immediate consequence of our deﬁnitions is the following theorem.
Theorem 6.6. If M and N are continuous L-pre-structures and h : M → N is a
surjective L-morphism, then h is an elementary L-morphism of M onto N.
Proof. Straightforward induction on formulae. 
Definition 6.7. Let M be a continuous L-pre-structure. Let t be a term and ϕ be
a formula such that all variables occurring in t and all free variables occurring in ϕ
appear among n distinct variables x0, . . . , xn−1. Deﬁne functions t˜
M,x¯ : Mn → M and
ϕ˜M,x¯ : Mn → [0, 1] by setting for all a¯ ∈Mn,
tM,a¯ := tM,σ
ϕ˜M,x¯(a¯) := M(ϕ, σ),
where σ is an M-assignment such that σ(xi) = ai for each i < n.
We have all of the ingredients necessary to prove the following theorem.
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Theorem 6.8. Let M be a continuous L-pre-structure. Then for every term t and for-
mula ϕ the mappings t˜M,x¯ : Mn → M and ϕ˜M,x¯ : Mn → [0, 1] are uniformly continuous.
Proof. By induction on terms and formulae, using the fact that moduli of uniform con-
tinuity can be built up from other moduli, as mentioned in Remark 5.8. 
Using Lemma 6.4, Theorem 6.6, and Theorem 6.8 , one can prove the following:
Theorem 6.9 (Existence of Metric Completion). Let L be a continuous signature with
a metric, and let M be a continuous L-pre-structure. Then there is a continuous L-
structure M̂ and an elementary L-morphism of M into M̂.
Proof. The proof invokes elementary facts about metric spaces, pseudo-metrics, Cauchy
sequences, and metric completions. Essential to this proof is the fact that for all metric
spaces (M, d) and (M ′, d′) such that (M ′, d′) is complete and N ⊆ M , if f : N → M ′
is a mapping and δ is a modulus of uniform continuity for f , then f can be uniquely
extended to a function f¯ : N¯ → M ′ such that δ is a modulus of uniform continuity for
f¯ (where N¯ denotes the closure of N in M). This fact is important insofar as it implies
that an underlying continuous signature with a metric will not have to be altered for a
metric completion. 
Definition 6.10. Let L be a continuous signature with a metric, let Γ ⊆ For(L), and
let ϕ be a formula.
(i) We write Γ QC ϕ if for every continuous L-structure M and M-assignment σ, if
(M, σ) Q Γ, then (M, σ) Q ϕ.
(ii) We say that Γ is completely satisﬁable or that Γ has a complete model if there is
a continuous L-structure M and M-assignment σ such that (M, σ) models Γ.
We therefore have the following corollary:
Corollary 6.11. Let L be a continuous signature with a metric, and let Γ ⊆ For(L).
Then for every formula ϕ,
(i) Γ Q ϕ if and only if Γ QC ϕ.
(ii) Γ is satisﬁable if and only if Γ is completely satisﬁable.
We may thereby restrict the notion of logical entailment to continuous L-structures.
In classical ﬁrst-order logic, if one were to require a distinguished binary relation symbol
≈ be interpreted only as a congruence relation in each classical structure rather than as
strict equality, then one could show for each such structure that there is a surjective
elementary L-morphism (in the obvious sense) onto its quotient structure. Accordingly,
we would ﬁnd that classical ﬁrst-order logic does not distinguish between structures which
require that ≈ be interpreted as a congruence relation and structures which require that
≈ be interpreted as strict equality.
In continuous ﬁrst-order logic, we see a somewhat analogous result. We require that
a distinguished binary relation symbol d be interpreted as a pseudo-metric that satisﬁes
14 ITAI¨ BEN YAACOV AND ARTHUR PAUL PEDERSEN
congruence properties, akin to those of classical ﬁrst-order logic (cf. Deﬁnition 5.6,
parts (iii) and (iv)). One can show that for each L-pre-structure, there is a surjective
elementary L-morphism onto its quotient structure (which essentially transforms d into a
genuine metric). Yet one can go one step further: For any L-pre-structure with a genuine
metric, there is an injective elementary L-morphism (and a fortiori an isometry) into its
completion, a continuous L-structure. Therefore, continuous ﬁrst-order logic does not
distinguish between continuous L-pre-structures and continuous L-structures. Theorem
6.9 can be seen as encoding this fact. As you would expect, most of our work does not
rely on this fact, but it nevertheless indicates what matters.
7. Axioms: Group 2
Before we present the second group of axioms, let us deﬁne a notion familiar from
classical ﬁrst-order logic. We say that a formula ϕ is a generalization of a formula ψ
if for some n < ω there are variables x1, . . . , xn such that ϕ = supx1· · · supxn ψ (see
[End01]). Observe that every formula is a generalization of itself.
When all generalizations of the following eight axiom schemata are added to all gener-
alizations of (A1) – (A6) (in the appropriate language of course), we obtain an axioma-
tization for continuous ﬁrst-order logic. In this article we show that this axiomatization
is complete. Formal deductions and provability are deﬁned as in §3, the only rule of
inference again being modus ponens. We write Γ ⊢Q ϕ to indicate that ϕ is provable
from Γ in continuous ﬁrst-order logic. Recall that a formula ϕ is provable from Γ just in
case it is provable from a ﬁnite subset of Γ.
The ﬁrst three schemata are analogues of axiom schemata of classical ﬁrst-order logic
(see [End01]).
(A7) (supx ψ −
. supx ϕ)−
. supx(ψ −
. ϕ)
(A8) ϕ[t/x]−. supx ϕ, where substitution is correct
(A9) supx ϕ−
. ϕ, where x is not free in ϕ
If we are dealing with a continuous signature with a metric, we add:
(A10) dxx
(A11) dxy −. dyx
(A12) (dxz −. dxy)−. dyz
(A13) For each f ∈ F , ǫ ∈ (0, 1], and r, q ∈ D with r > ǫ and q < δf,i(ǫ), the following
is an axiom (where |x¯| = i and |x¯|+ |y¯|+ 1 = nf):
(q −. dzw) ∧ (dfx¯zy¯f x¯wy¯ −. r)
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(A14) For each P ∈ R, ǫ ∈ (0, 1], and r, q ∈ D with r > ǫ and q < δP,i(ǫ), the following
is an axiom (where |x¯| = i and |x¯|+ |y¯|+ 1 = nP ):
(q −. dzw) ∧ ((P x¯zy¯ −. P x¯wy¯)−. r)
Axiom schemata (A10) – (A12) assert that d is pseudo-metric. These axiom schemata
correspond to the equivalence relation axiom schemata of classical ﬁrst-order logic. Al-
though less immediate, (A13) – (A14) deﬁne the uniform continuity moduli with respect
to the ith argument.
Let us informally consider (A13). Suppose (A13) holds and that d(z, w) < δf,i(ǫ).
Then there is q ∈ D such that d(z, w) < q < δf,i(ǫ), so q −
. d(z, w) > 0, whence by
(A13) it follows that d(f(x¯, z, y¯), f(x¯, w, y¯))−. r = 0, i.e., d(f(x¯, z, y¯), f(x¯, w, y¯)) ≤ r for
every r > ǫ. Thus, d(f(x¯, z, y¯), f(x¯, w, y¯)) ≤ ǫ, so δf,i is a uniform continuity modulus
of f with respect to the ith argument. Conversely, suppose δf,i is a uniform continuity
modulus of f with respect to the ith argument and that r, q ∈ D are such that r > ǫ
and q < δP,i(ǫ). On the one hand, if q −
. d(z, w) > 0, then d(z, w) < q < δf,i(ǫ) and
so d(f(x¯, z, y¯), f(x¯, w, y¯)) ≤ ǫ < r, whence d(f(x¯, z, y¯), f(x¯, w, y¯))−. r = 0 and therefore
(q −. d(z, w)) ∧ (d(f(x¯, z, y¯), f(x¯, w, y¯))−. r) = 0. On the other hand, if q −. d(z, w) ≤ 0,
again we have (q −. d(z, w)) ∧ (d(f(x¯, z, y¯), f(x¯, w, y¯))−. r) = 0.
Remark 7.1. In view of Remark 5.8, the reader may have noticed that a continuous
signature could equivalently be deﬁned so that G may instead have the form {δs : (0, 1]→
(0, 1] : s ∈ R∪F}, whereby one could forgo talk of moduli of uniform continuity of each
symbol s with respect to each of its arguments. In particuar, (A13) could be replaced by
(A13′) For every ǫ ∈ (0, 1] and r, q ∈ D with r > ǫ and q < ∆f(ǫ), the following is an
axiom:
(q −.
∨
i<nf
dxiyi) ∧ (dfx0 · · ·xnf−1fy0 · · · ynf−1 −
. r)
(A14) could also be replaced by an analogous axiom. Situations might arise in which the
uniform continuity moduli of a symbol with respect to each of its arguments are very
diﬀerent, and one might desire to keep track of this, thereby preferring one deﬁnition
over the other.
We conclude this section with a soundness theorem.
Theorem 7.2 (Soundness). Let L be a continuous signature (with a metric), and let
Γ ⊆ For(L). Then for every formula ϕ,
(i) If Γ ⊢Q ϕ, then Γ Q ϕ (Γ QC ϕ).
(ii) If Γ is (completely) satisﬁable, then Γ is consistent.
Proof. It suﬃces to show that each axiom schema is valid. The facts recorded in §4 can
be used to show that (A1) – (A6) are valid, while the results from §6 can be used to
prove that (A7) – (A9) are valid. The discussion following (A14) explains why (A10) –
(A14) are valid. 
16 ITAI¨ BEN YAACOV AND ARTHUR PAUL PEDERSEN
8. The Essentials
In this section, we rely heavily on facts recorded in §4 insofar as we exploit obvious rela-
tions amongst continuous ﬁrst-order logic and continuous and  Lukasiewicz propositional
logics.
The Deduction Theorem, Generalization Theorem, and a Lemma about Bound
Substitution. Observe
{(P −. Q)−. Q,Q} ⊢ L P, but
{(P −. Q)−. Q} 0 L P −. Q.
Thus the reader should be unsurprised to ﬁnd that continuous ﬁrst-order logic only
satisﬁes a weak version of the classical Deduction Theorem.
Theorem 8.1 (Deduction Theorem). Let Γ ⊆ For(L), and let ϕ, ψ be formulae.
Then Γ ∪ {ψ} ⊢Q ϕ if and only if Γ ⊢Q ϕ−
. nψ for some n < ω.
Proof. Right to left is clear. For the implication from left to right, observe that for all
α, β, γ and n,m < ω,
⊢ L ((β −. (n+m)α)−. ((β −. γ)−. nα))−. (γ −. mα).
This can be shown using the semantics of  Lukasiewicz propositional logic. The proof
then proceeds by induction on the set of consequences of Γ ∪ {ψ}. 
Lemma 8.2 (Generalization Theorem). Let Γ ⊆ For(L), and let ϕ be a formula. If
Γ ⊢ ϕ and x is not a free variable in Γ, then Γ ⊢ supx ϕ.
Proof. This is similar to the proof of the Generalization Theorem for classical ﬁrst-order
logic (see [End01]). 
To illustrate how we rely on facts recorded in §4 , we provide a proof of the next lemma.
Lemma 8.3. Let ϕ be a formula, and let y be a variable which does not occur in ϕ. Then
(a) ⊢Q ϕ−
. ϕ{y/x}.
(b) ⊢Q ϕ{y/x} −
. ϕ.
Proof. This is proved by induction on ϕ for y which does not occur in ϕ.
ϕ = Pt0 · · · tnP−1: Then by deﬁnition ϕ{y/x} = ϕ; since ⊢Qϕ−
. ϕ, we are done.
ϕ = 1
2
ψ: Then by deﬁnition ϕ{y/x} = 1
2
ψ{y/x} and this bound substitution
is correct. So by the induction hypothesis, we have ⊢Q ψ −
. ψ{y/x} and ⊢Q
ψ{y/x} −. ψ. Now observe
⊢C L
1
2
α−. α, and
⊢C L(
1
2
β −.
1
2
α)−.
1
2
(β −. α).
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Thus by a few applications of modus ponens, we arrive at (a) and (b).
ϕ = ¬ψ: Then again by deﬁnition ϕ{y/x} = ¬ψ{y/x} and this bound substitu-
tion is correct. Observe
⊢ L (¬α−. ¬β)−. (β −. α).
Using the induction hypothesis and modus ponens we obtain (a) and (b).
ϕ = (β −. α): Then ϕ{y/x} = (β{y/x} −. α{y/x}) and β{y/x} and α{y/x} are
correct. Our induction hypothesis supplies us
⊢Q α−
. α{y/x},
⊢Q α{y/x} −
. α,
and
⊢Q β −
. β{y/x},
⊢Q β{y/x} −
. β.
Moreover, observe
⊢ L (((β ′ −. α′)−. (β −. α))−. (β ′ −. β))−. (α−. α′).
Hence, by repeated applications of modus ponens and the induction hypothesis,
we obtain (a) and (b).
ϕ = supx ψ: Then ϕ{y/x} = supx ψ[y/x] and this substitution is correct (y is not
free in ψ). Hence,
⊢Q ψ[y/x]−
. supxψ (A8)
⊢Q supy(ψ[y/x]−
. supxψ) (Generalization Theorem)
⊢Q (supyψ[y/x]−
. supy supxψ)−
. supy(ψ[y/x]−
. supxψ) (A7)
⊢Q supyψ[y/x]−
. supy supxψ (modus ponens)
⊢Q ((supyψ[y/x]−
. supxψ)−
. (supyψ[y/x]−
. supy supxψ))−
. (supy supxψ −
. supxψ) (A2)
⊢Q supy supxψ −
. supxψ (A9) (y is not free in supxψ),
from which it follows by applying modus ponens several times that ⊢Q ϕ{y/x}−
. ϕ.
A similar argument can be used to establish (a).
ϕ = supz ψ and z 6= x: Then ϕ{y/x} = supz ψ{y/x} and this bound substitution
is correct. Apply the induction hypothesis, the Generalization Theorem, (A7),
and modus ponens to obtain (a) and (b). 
If c is an 0-ary function symbol (what we of course call a constant symbol) and x is a
variable, we may deﬁne ϕ[x/c] in the expected way. However, we omit a formal deﬁnition
and state a lemma without proof.
Lemma 8.4. Let Γ ⊆ For(L), and let ϕ be a formula. If Γ ⊢Q ϕ, c is a constant symbol
that does not occur in Γ, and x does not occur in ϕ, then Γ ⊢Q supx ϕ[x/c].
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Maximal Consistent Sets of Formulae. In classical ﬁrst-order logic, we say that a
set ∆ of formulae is maximal consistent if ∆ is consistent and for every formula ϕ,
ϕ ∈ ∆ or ¬ϕ ∈ ∆.
In continuous ﬁrst-order, however, this deﬁnition will not do. For we certainly should like
to exclude both 1
2
and ¬1
2
from every consistent set. In this subsection, we show what
one should mean by calling a set of formulae maximal consistent in continuous ﬁrst-order
logic.
Lemma 8.5. Let Γ ⊆ For(L) be consistent. Then for all formulae ϕ, ψ,
(i) If Γ ⊢Q ϕ−
. 2−n for all n < ω then Γ ∪ {ϕ} is consistent.
(ii) Either Γ ∪ {ϕ−. ψ} or Γ ∪ {ψ −. ϕ} is consistent.
Proof.
(i) Suppose Γ ⊢Q ϕ−
. 2−n for all n < ω. For reductio ad absurdum, assume Γ ∪ {ϕ}
is inconsistent. Then by the Deduction Theorem, Γ ⊢ 1 −. mϕ for some m < ω.
Observe
⊢ L (((β −. ασ(0))−
. ασ(1))−
. · · · −. ασ(k−1))−
. (((β −. α0)−
. α1)−
. · · · −. αk−1)
for any k < ω and permutation σ on k. By repeated uses of this fact, axiom (A2),
and our supposition, we ﬁnd that Γ ⊢Q ((1 −
. 2−1) −. 2−2) −. · · · −. 2−m, so Γ is
inconsistent, yielding a contradiction.
(ii) Suppose Γ ∪ {ϕ−. ψ} is inconsistent. Then by the Deduction Theorem, there is
n < ω such that Γ ⊢Q 1 −
. n(ϕ −. ψ). Observe that for all m < ω, ⊢ L (β −. α) −.
(1−. m(α−. β)), whereby it follows that ⊢Q (ϕ−
. ψ)−. (1−. n(ϕ−. ψ)). Hence, by
modus ponens we have Γ ⊢Q ψ −
. ϕ, so Γ ∪ {ψ −. ϕ} is consistent.

Lemma 8.6. Let Γ ⊆ For(L) be consistent, and let E(Γ) := {Γ′ : Γ ⊆ Γ′ ⊆ For(L) and Γ′ is consistent}
Then ∆ is a maximal member of E(Γ) if and only if for all formulae ϕ, ψ,
(i) Γ ⊆ ∆ and ∆ is consistent.
(ii) If ∆ ⊢Q ϕ−
. 2−n for all n < ω then ϕ ∈ ∆.
(iii) ϕ−. ψ ∈ ∆ or ψ −. ϕ ∈ ∆.
Proof.
(⇒) If ∆ is a maximal member of E(Γ), then (i) is immediate, while (ii) and (iii)
follow from Lemma 8.5.
(⇐) Suppose (i), (ii), and (iii) hold. Let Γ′ ∈ E(Γ) be such that ∆ ⊆ Γ′. Assume
ϕ ∈ Γ′. Then for every n < ω, 2−n −. ϕ /∈ Γ′ and so ϕ−. 2−n ∈ ∆. It follows that
ϕ ∈ ∆, as desired. 
Remark 8.7. In continuous propositional logic, conditions (ii) and (iii) are independent.
To see this, let S be a continuous propositional logic. First we show that (ii) does not
imply (iii). Let ∆ := {ϕ ∈ S : ⊢C L ϕ}. Observe that by completeness of continuous
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propositional logic (Fact 4.5), ∆ is consistent, and if ∆ ⊢C Lϕ −. 2−n for all n < ω, then
ϕ ∈ ∆. However, since 0C L P −. 1
2
and 0C L 1
2
−. P , neither P −. 1
2
nor 1
2
−. P is in ∆. We now
show that (iii) does not imply (ii). Let Γ := {P −. 2−n : n < ω}. Then Γ is consistent,
and so by (ii) of Lemma 8.5 we can construct a consistent set ∆ ⊇ Γ such that for every
ϕ, ψ ∈ S, either ϕ−. ψ ∈ ∆ or ψ−. ϕ ∈ ∆. Nonetheless, ∆ ⊢C L P −. 2−n for all n < ω, yet
P /∈ ∆.
Lemma 8.6 justiﬁes the following the deﬁnition.
Definition 8.8. Let ∆ ⊆ For(L). We say that ∆ is maximal consistent if ∆ is consistent
and for all formulae ϕ, ψ,
(i) If ∆ ⊢Q ϕ−
. 2−n for all n < ω then ϕ ∈ ∆.
(ii) ϕ−. ψ ∈ ∆ or ψ −. ϕ ∈ ∆.
Condition (i) says that if ∆ can furnish a series of proofs which altogether indicate
that ϕ is a consequence of ∆, then ∆ must be granted ϕ. Condition (ii) says that ∆ can
compare any two formulae.
Remark 8.9. Observe that if ∆ a maximal consistent set of formulae, then ϕ ∈ ∆ if and
only if ∆ ⊢Q ϕ. It can be shown that in the above deﬁnition condition (i) can be replaced
by condition (i′): If {ϕ −. 2−n : n < ω} ⊆ ∆, then ϕ ∈ ∆. Indeed, condition (i′) is also
independent of (ii) in continuous propositional logic.
We thereby obtain the following result.
Theorem 8.10. If Γ ⊆ For(L) is consistent, then there exists a maximal consistent set
of formulae ∆ ⊇ Γ.
Proof. By Zorn’s Lemma and Lemma 8.6. 
Lemma 8.11. Let Γ ⊆ For(L), let ∆ be a maximal consistent set of formulae containing
Γ, let t be a term, and let p ∈ D. Then if supx ϕ−
. p ∈ ∆, there is a formula ϕ′ such that
ϕ ≡ ϕ′ and ϕ′[t/x]−. p ∈ ∆.
Proof. By Lemma 6.4, there is a formula ϕ′ such that no variable of t is bound in ϕ′
and ϕ ≡ ϕ′, so by repeated applications of Lemma 8.3 and (A2), we have ⊢Q ϕ
′ −. ϕ.
Then by the Generalization Theorem, ⊢Q supx(ϕ
′ −. ϕ), whence by (A7) it follows that
⊢Q supx ϕ
′−. supx ϕ. Now as supx ϕ−
. p ∈ ∆, by (A2) we have ∆ ⊢Q supx ϕ
′−. p. Because
ϕ′[t/x] is correct, again by (A2) and by (A8) we have ∆ ⊢Q ϕ
′[t/x] −. supx ϕ, so once
more by (A2) it follows that ∆ ⊢Q ϕ
′[t/x]−. p. Therefore, since ∆ is maximal consistent,
we conclude that ϕ′[t/x]−. p ∈ ∆, as desired. 
We will use the following lemma to deﬁne a continuous pre-structure and to help us
in parts of our proof of completeness.
20 ITAI¨ BEN YAACOV AND ARTHUR PAUL PEDERSEN
Lemma 8.12. Let Γ ⊆ For(L) be consistent, let ∆ be a maximal consistent set of for-
mulae containing Γ, and let ϕ be a formula. Then
sup{p ∈ D : p−. ϕ ∈ ∆} = inf{q ∈ D : ϕ−. q ∈ ∆}.
Proof. Straightforward, by Lemma 8.6. 
9. Completeness Theorem
In classical ﬁrst-order logic, we say that a set Γ of formulae is Henkin complete if for
every formula ϕ and variable x, there is a constant c such that
¬∀xϕ→ ¬ϕ[c/x] ∈ Γ.
The intuition to deﬁne a Henkin complete set in continuous ﬁrst-order logic as the syn-
tactic translation of this deﬁnition will not work. Indeed, if Γ is maximal consistent
and ¬ supx ¬ϕ ∈ Γ, i.e., infx ϕ ∈ Γ, we would be better oﬀ to not require that there is
a constant c such that ϕ[c/x] ∈ Γ. For example, a perfectly consistent situation could
arise in which infx ϕ ∈ Γ, there is a sequence of formulae (ϕ[ti/x] : i < ω) such that
Γ ⊢Q ϕ[tn/x] −
. 2−n for each n < ω, yet each term t has a non-zero pt ∈ D such that
Γ ⊢Q pt−
. ϕ[t/x], whereby we should certainly not require that there is a term t such that
ϕ[t/x] ∈ Γ. Rather than attempt to prevent this sort of situation from ever occurring,
we wish to accommodate this sort of situation in our deﬁnition of a Henkin complete set.
Definition 9.1. Let Γ be a set of formulae. We say that Γ is Henkin complete if for
every formula ϕ, variable x, and p, q ∈ D with p < q, there is a constant symbol c such
that
(supx ϕ−
. q) ∧ (p−. ϕ[c/x]) ∈ Γ.
The next proposition guarantees we can construct a consistent Henkin complete set.
Proposition 9.2. Let L be a continuous signature. There exists a continuous signature
Lc with L ⊆ Lc and a set Γc ⊆ For(Lc) such that for every Γ ⊆ For(L),
(i) Γ ∪ Γc is Henkin complete.
(ii) If Γ is consistent, then Γ ∪ Γc is consistent.
Proof. Permitting some abuse of notation, we deﬁne an increasing sequence of signatures
inductively:
L0 := L
Ln+1 := Ln ∪ {c(ϕ,x,p,q) : ϕ ∈ For(Ln), x ∈ V, and p, q ∈ D with p < q}
where each c(ϕ,x,p,q) is a new constant symbol. We then put
Lc :=
⋃
n<ωLn
ψ(ϕ,x,p,q) := (supx ϕ−
. q) ∧ (p−. ϕ[c(ϕ,x,p,q)/x]) and
Γc := {ψ(ϕ,x,p,q) : ϕ ∈ For(L
c), x ∈ V, and p, q ∈ D with p < q}.
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(i) is obviously true, so we proceed to establish (ii).
Suppose Γ is consistent. For reductio ad absurdum, assume Γ∪Γc is inconsistent. Then
there is a minimal ﬁnite non-empty Γc0 ⊆ Γ
c such that Γ ∪ Γc0 is inconsistent. We may
write Γc0 = {ψ(ϕi,xi,pi,qi) : i < n}, where the (ϕi, xi, pi, qi) are pairwise distinct. For each
i < n, there is a minimal mi such that ϕi ∈ For(Lmi). Let mi0 be the maximal such mi.
For simplicity of notation, put ϕ := ϕi0 , x := xi0 , p := pi0 , q := qi0 , and m := mi0 .
Now observe that for each i < n, ϕi ∈ For(Lm), while c(ϕ,x,p,q) ∈ Lm+1\Lm. Put
Γc1 := Γ
c
0\{ψ(ϕ,x,p,q)} and Γ1 := Γ ∪ Γ
c
1. Note that c(ϕ,x,p,q) does not occur in Γ1 and that
Γ1 must be consistent (by the minimality of Γ
c
0). Nonetheless, Γ ∪ Γ
c
0 = Γ1 ∪ {(supx ϕ−
.
q)∧ (p−. ϕ[c(ϕ,x,p,q)/x])} is inconsistent. Observe that ⊢
 L (α∧ β)−. α and ⊢ L (α∧ β)−. β.
Thus, by modus ponens,
Γ1 ∪ {(supxϕ−
. q)} ⊢Q (supxϕ−
. q) ∧ (p−. ϕ[c(ϕ,x,p,q)/x]), and
Γ1 ∪ {(p−
. ϕ[c(ϕ,x,p,q)/x])} ⊢Q (supxϕ−
. q) ∧ (p−. ϕ[c(ϕ,x,p,q)/x]).
Since Γ ∪ Γc0 is inconsistent, by the Deduction Theorem there is n < ω such that Γ1 ⊢Q
1 −. n((supx ϕ −
. q) ∧ (p −. ϕ[c(ϕ,x,p,q)/x])). Therefore, by modus ponens, we ﬁnd that
Γ1 ∪ {(supx ϕ−
. q)} and Γ1 ∪ {(p−
. ϕ[c(ϕ,x,p,q)/x])} are both inconsistent. It follows that
Γ1 ⊢Q (q −
. supx ϕ) and Γ1 ⊢Q (ϕ[c(ϕ,x,p,q)/x]−
. p) (cf. proof of Lemma 8.5).
Now let y be a variable not occurring in ϕ. On the one hand, by Lemma 8.3 we have
Γ1 ⊢Q (q −
. supx ϕ){y/x} −
. (q −. supx ϕ), so by modus ponens,
Γ1 ⊢Q (q −
. supxϕ){y/x} = (q{y/x} −
. supyϕ[y/x])
= (q −. supyϕ[y/x]).
On the other hand, because c(ϕ,x,p,q) does not occur in Γ1, by Lemma 8.4 we have
Γ1 ⊢Q supy(ϕ[c(ϕ,x,p,q)/x]−
. p)[y/c(ϕ,x,p,q)] = supy(ϕ[c(ϕ,x,p,q)/x][y/c(ϕ,x,p,q)]−
. p[y/c(ϕ,x,p,q)])
= supy(ϕ[y/x]−
. p).
Then by (A7) and modus ponens, Γ1 ⊢Q supy ϕ[y/x] −
. supy p. Since y is not free in p,
(A9) yields Γ1 ⊢Q supy p−
. p. Thus by (A2) and modus ponens, Γ1 ⊢Q supy ϕ[y/x]−
. p.
It remains to observe that since Γ1 ⊢Q (q −
. supy ϕ[y/x]) and Γ1 ⊢Q supy ϕ[y/x] −
. p,
by (A2) we have Γ1 ⊢Q q −
. p, so Γ1 is inconsistent, which is impossible (q −
. p ∈ D and
q −. p > 0 by construction). 
Definition 9.3. We deﬁne the rank of ϕ, rank(ϕ), by recursion:
rank(Pt0 · · · tnP−1) := 0.
rank(1
2
ϕ) := rank(ϕ) + 1.
rank(¬ϕ) := rank(ϕ) + 1.
rank(ϕ−. ψ) := rank(ϕ) + rank(ψ) + 1.
rank(supx ϕ) := rank(ϕ) + 1.
Theorem 9.4. Let L be a continuous signature (possibly with a metric), and let Γ ⊆
For(L). Assume Γ is consistent. Then there is a continuous signature Lc ⊇ L, a maximal
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consistent and Henkin complete set ∆ ⊆ For(Lc) with ∆ ⊇ Γ, a continuous Lc-pre-
structure M, and an M-assignment σ such that (M, σ) Q ∆.
Proof. Suppose Γ is consistent. By the previous proposition, there is Γc ⊆ For(Lc) such
that Γ ∪ Γc is consistent and Henkin complete, so by Theorem 8.10 there is a maximal
consistent ∆ ⊆ For(Lc) such that ∆ ⊇ Γ ∪ Γc. Deﬁne a continuous Lc-pre-structure M
such that M is the set of all Lc-terms.
(i) For each f ∈ F , deﬁne fM : Mnf →M by setting
fM(t0, . . . , tnf−1) := ft0 · · · tnf−1 for all t0, . . . , tnf−1 ∈M.
(ii) For each P ∈ R, deﬁne PM : MnP → [0, 1] by setting
PM(t0, . . . , tnP−1) := sup{p ∈ D : p−
. P t0 · · · tnP−1 ∈ ∆}
for all t0, . . . , tnP−1 ∈M .
Deﬁne an M-assignment σ by setting σ(x) := x for all x ∈ V . It is a simple matter to
check that tM,σ = t for all terms t.
It suﬃces to prove by induction on the number of quantiﬁers and connectives in ϕ,
i.e., the rank of ϕ, that M(ϕ, σ) = sup{p ∈ D : p−. ϕ ∈ ∆} for all ϕ ∈ For(Lc). For the
sake of brevity, here we only consider the subcases ϕ = 1
2
ψ and ϕ = supx ψ. Although
the case for rank(ϕ) = 0 is trivial, we encourage the reader to work out the subcases of
¬ and −. for rank(ϕ) > 0.
ϕ = 1
2
ψ: We wish to show that M(1
2
ψ, σ) = sup{p ∈ D : p −. 1
2
ψ ∈ ∆}. By deﬁnition,
M(1
2
ψ, σ) = 1
2
sup{p ∈ D : p−. ψ ∈ ∆}, and by induction hypothesis, M(ψ, σ) = sup{p ∈
D : p −. ψ ∈ ∆}. We must therefore show 1
2
sup{p ∈ D : p −. ψ ∈ ∆} = sup{p ∈ D :
p−. 1
2
ψ ∈ ∆}. We consider two cases.
(a) By Fact 4.5, since ∆ is maximal consistent, for every p ∈ D, p −. 1
2
ψ ∈ ∆ only
if ¬(¬p −. p) −. ψ ∈ ∆. Hence, for every p ∈ D such that p −. 1
2
ψ ∈ ∆, p ≤
1
2
¬(¬p −. p) ≤ 1
2
sup{p ∈ D : p −. ψ ∈ ∆}. It follows that sup{p ∈ D : p −. 1
2
ψ ∈
∆} ≤ 1
2
sup{p ∈ D : p−. ψ ∈ ∆}.
(b) By Fact 4.5, since ∆ is maximal consistent, for every p ∈ D, p −. ψ ∈ ∆ only if
1
2
p−. 1
2
ψ ∈ ∆ (cf. proof of Lemma 8.3). Hence, for every p ∈ D such that p−. ψ ∈ ∆,
1
2
p ≤ sup{p ∈ D : p −. 1
2
ψ ∈ ∆} and therefore p ≤ 2 sup{p ∈ D : p −. 1
2
ψ ∈ ∆}.
It follows that sup{p ∈ D : p −. ψ ∈ ∆} ≤ 2 sup{p ∈ D : p −. 1
2
ψ ∈ ∆}, whence
1
2
sup{p ∈ D : p−. ψ ∈ ∆} ≤ sup{p ∈ D : p−. 1
2
ψ ∈ ∆}, as desired.
ϕ = supx ψ: We wish to show that M(supx ψ, σ) = sup{p ∈ D : p−
. supx ψ ∈ ∆}. Observe
that by deﬁnition M(supx ψ, σ) = sup{M(ψ, σ
t
x) : t ∈ M}. So it suﬃces to show that
sup{M(ψ, σtx) : t ∈ M} = sup{p ∈ D : p −
. supx ψ ∈ ∆}. For reductio ad absurdum,
assume this equality fails to hold. We of course consider two cases.
(a) Suppose sup{M(ψ, σtx) : t ∈ M} < sup{p ∈ D : p−
. supx ψ ∈ ∆}. Then for some
p, q ∈ D, sup{M(ψ, σtx) : t ∈ M} < p < q < sup{p ∈ D : p−
. supx ψ ∈ ∆}. Since
Γc ⊆ ∆ and p < q, there is a constant c such that (supx ψ −
. q) ∧ (p −. ψ[c/x]) ∈
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∆. Furthermore, there is r ∈ D such that q < r and r −. supx ψ ∈ ∆. As
∆ is maximal consistent, by Fact 4.5 it follows that p −. ψ[c/x] ∈ ∆. Since
rank(ψ[c/x]) < rank(ϕ), our induction hypothesis tells us that M(ψ[c/x], σ) =
sup{p ∈ D : p−. ψ[c/x] ∈ ∆}. Also, since ψ[c/x] is correct, by Lemma 6.2 it follows
that M(ψ[c/x], σ) = M(ψ, σcx). Thus p ≤ M(ψ, σ
c
x) ≤ sup{M(ψ, σ
t
x) : t ∈ M},
yielding a contradiction.
(b) Suppose sup{p ∈ D : p −. supx ψ ∈ ∆} < sup{M(ψ, σ
t
x) : t ∈ M}. On the one
hand, since ∆ is maximal consistent, for all p ∈ D such that p > sup{p ∈ D :
p −. supx ψ ∈ ∆}, supx ψ −
. p ∈ ∆. On the other hand, there must be t ∈ M
such that M(ψ, σtx) > sup{p ∈ D : p −
. supx ψ ∈ ∆}, so there is p ∈ D such
that M(ψ, σtx) > p > sup{p ∈ D : p −
. supx ψ ∈ ∆}. Thus supx ψ −
. p ∈ ∆,
whence by Lemma 8.11, there is ψ′ ≡ ψ such that ψ′[t/x] −. p ∈ ∆. Thus inf{p :
ψ′[t/x] −. p ∈ ∆} ≤ p. By Lemma 8.12, inf{p : ψ′[t/x] −. p ∈ ∆} = sup{p ∈ D :
p−. ψ′[t/x] ∈ ∆}, and because rank(ψ′[t/x]) < rank(ϕ), our induction hypothesis
tells us that M(ψ′[t/x], σ) = sup{p ∈ D : p −. ψ′[t/x] ∈ ∆}. Moreover, since
ψ′[t/x] is correct, M(ψ′[t/x], σ) = M(ψ′, σtx) by Lemma 6.2. Finally, since ψ
′ ≡ ψ,
we have M(ψ′, σtx) = M(ψ, σ
t
x). It follows that M(ψ, σ
t
x) ≤ p, yielding another
contradiction.
Now if ϕ ∈ ∆, then by (A1), ϕ −. 0 ∈ ∆, so M(ϕ, σ) = sup{p ∈ D : p −. ϕ ∈ ∆} =
inf{q ∈ D : ϕ −. q ∈ ∆} = 0 (Lemma 8.12). This shows that (M, σ) Q ∆, proving our
theorem. 
We may now state and prove the long-awaited completeness theorem.
Theorem 9.5 (Completeness for Continuous First-Order Logic).
Let L be a continuous signature, and let Γ ⊆ For(L). Then Γ is consistent only if Γ is
satisﬁable. Furthermore, if L is a continuous signature with a metric, then Γ is consistent
only if Γ is completely satisﬁable.
Proof. By Theorem 9.4, there is a continuous signature Lc ⊇ L, a maximal consistent
set ∆ ⊆ For(Lc) with ∆ ⊇ Γ, an Lc-pre-structure M, and an M-assignment σ such
that (M, σ) Q ∆. If L does not have a metric, we are done; we observe (M, σ) models
Γ and simply restrict M to our original signature. But if L has a metric d, we can
only guarantee that dM is a pseudo-metric relative to this restriction. We wish to ﬁnd a
continuous L-structure M̂ and an M̂-assignment σ̂ such that (M̂, σ̂) Q Γ. By Theorem
6.9, there is a continuous L-structure M̂ and an L-morphism ĥ : M → M̂ such that for
every formula ϕ, M(ϕ, σ) = M̂(ϕ, h ◦ σ). Therefore, putting σ̂ := h ◦ σ, since (M, σ)
models Γ, (M̂, σ̂) models Γ. 
We conclude with several corollaries. The following result has a counterpart in [Hay63]
(see also [Ha´j98]).
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Corollary 9.6 (Approximated Strong Completeness for Continuous Logic). Let L be a
continuous signature, letΓ ⊆ For(L), and let ϕ be a formula. Then Γ Q ϕ if and only
if Γ ⊢Q ϕ −
. 2−n for all n < ω. Moreover, if L is a continuous signature with a metric,
then Γ QC ϕ if and only if Γ ⊢Q ϕ−
. 2−n for all n < ω.
Proof. Right to left is by soundness (Theorem 7.2). For the implication from left to
right, if Γ  ϕ, then for every n < ω, Γ ∪ {2−n −. ϕ} is not (completely) satisﬁable and
so inconsistent by Theorem 9.5; hence, Γ ⊢ ϕ −. 2−n for all n < ω (cf. proof of Lemma
8.5). 
We can, however, try to make the best of the previous result. We ﬁrst oﬀer a deﬁnition.
Definition 9.7. Let L be a continuous signature (possibly with a metric), let Γ ⊆ For(L),
and let ϕ be a formula.
(i) We deﬁne the degree of truth of ϕ with respect to Γ, ϕ◦Γ, by setting
ϕ◦Γ := sup{M(ϕ, σ) : (M, σ)  Γ}.
(ii) We deﬁne the degree of provability of ϕ with respect to Γ, ϕ⊚Γ , by setting
ϕ⊚Γ := inf{p ∈ D : Γ ⊢ ϕ−
. p}.
We then have the following result, commonly called Pavelka-style completeness.
Corollary 9.8. Let L be a continuous signature, and let Γ ⊆ For(L). Then for every
formula ϕ, the degree of truth of ϕ with respect to Γ equals the degree of provability of ϕ
with respect to Γ. In other words,
ϕ◦Γ = ϕ
⊚
Γ .
Proof. We consider two cases:
(i) We ﬁrst show ϕ◦Γ ≤ ϕ
⊚
Γ . This follows from soundness (Theorem 7.2). To see this,
observe that for every p ∈ D such that Γ ⊢ ϕ−. p, by soundness Γ  ϕ−. p, so for
any continuous L(-pre)-structure M and M-assignment σ such that (M, σ)  Γ,
M(ϕ, σ) ≤ p; thus, ϕ◦Γ ≤ p. It follows that ϕ
◦
Γ ≤ ϕ
⊚
Γ .
(ii) We now show ϕ◦Γ ≥ ϕ
⊚
Γ . It suﬃces to show that for each p ∈ D such that
p < ϕ⊚Γ , there is a continuous L(-pre)-structure M and M-assignment σ such that
(M, σ)  Γ and p ≤ M(ϕ, σ). Let p ∈ D, and suppose p < ϕ⊚Γ . Then Γ 0 ϕ−
. p,
so Γ ∪ {p −. ϕ} is consistent (cf. proof of Lemma 8.5), whence by Theorem 9.5,
Γ ∪ {p −. ϕ} is (completely) satisﬁable. Hence, there is a continuous L(-pre)-
structure M and M-assignment σ such that (M, σ)  Γ and M(p−. ϕ, σ) = 0, so
p ≤ M(ϕ, σ).

Definition 9.9. Let L be a continuous signature with a metric.
(i) We call T a theory if T is a set of formulae in L without free variables, i.e., a set
of sentences.
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(ii) We call a theory T complete if there is a continuous L-structure M (and an M-
assignment σ) such that T = {ϕ : (M, σ) QC ϕ}. Otherwise, we call T an
incomplete theory.
Definition 9.10. Let T be a theory.
(i) If T is complete, we say T is decidable if for every sentence ϕ, the value ϕ◦T is a
recursive real and uniformly computable from ϕ.
(ii) If T is incomplete, we say T is decidable if for every sentence ϕ the real number
ϕ◦T is uniformly recursive from ϕ.
Corollary 9.11. Every complete theory with a recursive or recursively enumerable ax-
iomatization is decidable.
As with classical ﬁrst-order logic, the following corollary could be obtained more di-
rectly by way of an ultraproduct construction (see [BU]). We nevertheless include it for
the sake of completeness.
Corollary 9.12 (Compactness). Let L be a continuous signature, and let Γ ⊆ For(L).
If every ﬁnite subset Γ0 of Γ is (completely) satisﬁable, then Γ is (completely) satisﬁable.
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